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Note to Readers: This paper is an abridgment a/the secondhalf0/alarger
paper titled "The Possibility andNecessity ofMoralMarxism. " In theftrst
halfofthat paper I attempt to show that the central concepts ofMarxism
do not rule out reference to moral principles.
The problem of morality and evaluations is a difficult but central
one in Marxist thought. On one hand, Marx did and Marxists do make
scathing criticisms of capitalism and other socia-economic arrangements,
and propose that we replace them with the better arrangement of commu
nism. This assessment of social reality and the preference for one arrange
ment over another seems to require an appeal to some moral standard. On
the other hand, important elements of Marxist theorizing seem to exclude
such an appeal to moral principles. The concepts of ideology and historical
materialism appear to imply that a Marxist must regard all talk of universal.
objective moral standards as ideological illusion. Marxism seems to both
require and prohibit the use of morality in making evaluations.
Some Marxists have sought to resolve this tension by developing an
anti-moral Marxism. Allen Wood and others who take this approach seek to
show that evaluations inherent in Marxist thought are not morally based, but
rather are based on a collection of non-moral goods. Therefore, anti-moral
Marxists tell us, no reference to moral standards is necessary.
In this paper I hope to show that the anti-moral model of Marxism
is inadequate in accounting for the evaluations that Marxism makes, and
then briefly outline some morally based models that I think are more
effective. I will begin by stating the common ground between both moral
and anti-moral Marxists, specifically that Marxism requires an evaluative
perspective with certain characteristics. Then I will deal with some anti
moralist attempts to prove that this perspective need not refer to moral
principles, and show why those attempts fall. I will conclude by sketching
out some moralist evaluative perspectives that I think are original and
promising.
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Marxism's Evaluative Perspective
It is impossible to deny thatMarx made sweeping value judgements

and that those valuejudgements are central to the Marxist system ofthought.
Marx clearly regarded some social arrangements to be superior to others and
advocated activity which would make the world "better." What is not clear
is on what basis, or compared to what standard, Marx and Marxists can make
such evaluations.
A consistent Marxist evaluative perspective must contain several
elements. First, it must provide some standard or criteria for comparing
types of social relations and making judgements about which of these
systems is best, or at least better than another. These evaluations are an
integral part of Marxist thought. For instance, Marxism clearly states that
relations ofproduction in which the laborer is not alienated from the object
ofhis labor are preferable to those relations in which there is alienated labor.
Any Marxist evaluative perspective must account for this preference.
A Marxist evaluative perspective must also include some kind of
normative ethical principles. It is not enough to claim that one set of social
relations is better than another; the Marxist must also be committed to taking
an active and effective role in changing society to the preferred relations of
production. To paraphrase Marx, the important thing is not merely under
standing the world but changing it (Marx, p. 158). Thus any conSistently
Marxist evaluative perspective will show us not only why we oughtto prefer
OJle set of social relations over another but also why we should bother
ourselves to bring the better society about.
The Inadequacy of Anti-Moralist Evaluative Perspectives

Anti-moral Marxists have sought to meet these requirements for an
evaluative perspective in ways that do not require reference to, or use of,
transcendent moral principles. In the light of their arguments that it is
impossible to consistently hold both Marxist antl moral points of view, their
reasons for wanting not to refer to morality are obvious. l
Allen Wood gives one such argument for a non-moral Marxist
evaluative perspective. Wood claims that Marx's and the Marxist perspec
tive can be classified as "moral" inthe very broad sense ofbeing far reaching
1
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views about human well-being, butnotin the more proper sense ofthe word,
which designates what we ought to do or value, as opposed to what we do
or value simply because it is inherently satisfying. 2 He thinks that this is the
same sort of distinction that Kant and Mill make between moral and non
moral goods. 3
Wood next claims that Marx and Marxists base their evaluative
perspective on non-moral goods, such as self-actualization, health, security,
comfort, community, and fteedom. 4 1he implication of Wood's argument
here is that these things are good. and social relations that prevent or restrain
them bad, simply because these things satisfy us. Therefore no reference to
transcendent moral goodness is needed. All social arrangements can be
assessed as relatively good or bad to the degree that they allow for and
facilitate these non-moral goods.
There are several problems wIth the Simplistic definition of moral
and non-moral that Wood gives here. Many human actions seem to satisfy
his criteria for both moral and non-moral motivations. For example, I may
choose to eat more nutritious food both because it will make me feel better
and because I think it is a moral imperative for me to take care of my body.
Wood's distinction gives us no rellable way of determining whether eating
nutritiously is a moral or non-moral good.
In many cases, Wood's criteria for determining moralness are
dependent on each other. A moralist will find many actions and evaluations
to be inherently satisfying because they are moral, and a hedonist might very
well think that inherently satisfying activities and evaluations are morally
correct by virtue of the satisfaction they provide. If Wood is to be successful
in claiming that the evaluative perspective of Marxism can rest on reference
to principles of non-moral good, he must first provide an effective criterion
for distinguishing moral and non-moral goods.
Wood might answer by saying that we can use the distinctions made
by other philosophers such as Kant, Mm, and Hegel to determine what sorts
of "goods" are moral or non-moral. In several places he does rely on those
distinctions to show how the Marxist perspective differs from a moral one.S
Wood, Allen. Karl Marx. New York, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1989.
Karl Marx, p. 129.
~ Wood, Karl Marx, p. 127.
5 Wood, Allen. "Marx on Right and Justice: a Reply to Husami," Philosophy andPubli~
Affairs. VoI. 8, 1978-79. p. 284-87.
2
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1bis seems like a promising avenue, because both Kant's and Mill's ideas
of the non-moral are much more refined and definitive than the one Wood
gives. But that very refinement presents another problem.
Both Kant and Mill thought that non-moral goods were limited to
immediate self-interest or satisfaction. 6 But a Marxist evaluative perspec
tive must give us some reason for taking actions that deny, or at least
postpone, individual satisfaction. Wood's own Class Interest ThesIs states
that a consistent Marxist must adopt the interests of the proletarian class, not
pursue one's own individual interests.7 It may be that the two interests
ultimately converge, but the non-moral goods that Kant and Mill specify
give us no reason to postpone our satisfaction until the class interests of the
proletariat are victorious. Ifnon-moral goods are to serve as the basis of the
Marxist evaluative perspective, then Wood must show that some principle
of self-denial or communal interest is a non-moral good.
It seems to me that the only way of showing the diverting of one's
own interests to be "good" is by saying that one ought to do so. That would,
by Wood's definition, makeit a moral good. Thus, any consistently Marxist
evaluative perspective must contain reference to atleastone moral principle.
Similar problems come up in trying to explain concepts such as self
actualization, freedom, and community as non-moral goods. The category
of non-moral goods that Kant and Mill had in mind is too narrow to
accommodate these ideas, and no alternative definition of moralness had
been presented that is precise enough to be useful.
There is still another problem with Wood's attempt to base the
Marxist evaluative on non-moral goods. If to be non-moralistic means not
to make use of the word "ought," then there can be no ethically normative
principles for an anti-moralist. Yet the Marxist evaluative perspective
requires some such normative principles to tell us why we ought to change
society. Therefore, it seems that Wood's or any other anti-moral evaluative
perspective will fall short of what is required by the MarxIst evaluative
perspective.
Wood may be able to say that the mostinherently satisfying activity
for a human being is to take historically effective action directed at changing
the economic basis of society, but that is quite a different thing Ihan saying
'Wood, Karl Marx, p. 129.
7 Wood, Allen. "Justice and Class Interests," Philosophica, Summer, 1989. p. 19.
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that all people ought to take that action. This becomes clear when we
imagine that someone disagrees with Wood's assessment of what is most
satisfying. Such a person might claim that the most inherently satisfying
activity for a human being is to sit on a couch and watch television. Marxists
must, ifthey are to remain faithful to their revolutionary project, say that this
person was not acting rightly, because on the Marxist account humans ought
to be taking effective action to change society. But Wood has no basis for
making that judgement. If he claims that the television watcher is incorrect
and ought to be pursuing the non-moral goods of community, comfort, and
self-actualization, the pursuit of non-moral goods has become a moral
imperative. just as it does in Mill's philosophy.8 If Wood claims that the
pursuit of non-moral goods is part ofhuman nature, then he must either show
that all people agree on what are the most inherently satisfying activities, or
that those who do not agree with his own definition are wrong or irrational.
The first option flies in the face of the central Marxist concepts of class
conflict and historical change. The second option reduces Marxism to little
more than an extremely rationalistic conception of human nature, and
contradicts the Marxist thinking about ideology and materialism.9
Wood's attempt to construct an evaluative perspective based on
non-moral goods does not yield a result which meets all ofthe demands set
out earlier for what a consistently Marxist perspective must do. This implies
that a morally based evaluative perspective is needed,l 0 and that anti-moral
Marxism is inconsistent with the demands of Marxism itself. However,
which moral prinCiples Marxists should incorporate into their evaluative
perspectives is not readily apparent. There are a number of moralist
evaluative perspectives which meet the requirements for a Marxist evalua
tive perspective.

• Wood, Karl Marx, p. 130.
9 Buchanan. Allen E. Marx and Justice: The Radical Critique ofLiberalism. Totowa,
N.J., Rowman &. Littlefield, 1982, p. 34·5.
10 Or that Marxism is a self contradictory system of thought that prohibits the use of
moral principles and therefore can never hope to have the consistent evaluative perspective
that it claims to have. I have addressed this possibility in the part of the paper not included
bere, where I argue that while the Marxist concept of ideology will make us suspicious of
moral arguments and claims, nothing in the central concepts of Marxism prohibits the
possibility of appealing to transcendent moral principles.
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Some Moral Marxist Evaluative Perspectives

One such morally based Marxist evaluative perspective is sug
gested by G. A. Cohen. Cohen claims that Marxists ought to evaluate social
arrangements in relation to how well they protect and encourage certain
natural rights ofhuman beings. In his view. Marxists have done themselves
a disservice by completely discounting the idea that humans have certain
natural rights that cannot morally be denied them. In reacting against Robert
Nozickand other writers who use the "natural right" to hold private property
as a defense of capitalist SOciety. Marxists have traditionally denied that
there are any such things as natural rights, and claimed that all talk of such
rights is merely an ideological justification of the dominant class interests
in any given society. Cohen suggests that to be consistently Marxist we
oughtnot deny the existence of natural rights, but rather show that the natural
rights ofhumans are something quite different from what Nozick and other
apologists for capitalism have claimed. Instead of stating that all indi viduals
have the right to hold private property, Marxists should assert that all of
humanity has the inalienable right to hold property in common, to be free
from exploitation, and to live in a society free from class conflict. I I
Cohen says that we come to know what the natural rights of human
beings consist of through a process of intuitional rationalizing. Through
moral reflection we can all come to see what rights we are entiilcd to,
because the raw material for the moral principle of natural rights can be
found in every rational human being. 12
Cohen has been criticized for putting too much faith in the intuitive
rationality ofhumans. Nielsen claims that ifwe take the Marxist conception
of ideology seriously, we will see that each individual who intuitively
rationalizes about whatthe natural rights ofhuman beings are will inevitably
come up with a system that favours his or her own class interests. 13 I agree
with Nielsen on this point, but I also think that this process that Cohen calls
"intuitive rationalizing" caneffectivelybereplaced by amateriall y undistorted
II

Cohen, G.A. "Freedom, Justice, and Capitalism," New

Left Reyjgw April 1981

p. 91.-8; Nielsen, Kai. "Marxist Inunoralism and Marxist Moralism," Philosophy and Publk

Affiim. Summer 1989, p. 224-1.

12 Cohen, "Freedom, Justice, and Capitalism," p. 98-103; Nielsen, "MarxistImmoralism
and Marxist Moralism," p. 228.
13 N'IeIs en, ''M arxtst
. ImmoraI'Ism and Marxlst
. Moralism," p. 228-30.
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deliberation, in the Rawlsian tradition, that wouldeliminate the bias towards
favouring one's own class interests when thinking about what natural rights
come to be.
Kai Nielsen, Derek Allen, and many others have done a good deal
of writing to construct a Utilitarian evaluative perspective for Marxists.1 4
They claim that the best way for a Marxist to evaluate social relationships
is the degree to which they promote the greatest common good. The "goods"
themselves need not be moral ones, just as Mill and Wood claimed they were
not. But the pursuit of the greatest amount and degree of these non-moral
goods for the largest number of people is a moral imperative, according to
Utilitarian Marxism. On this basis, Utilitarian Marxists tell us that we ought
to bring about a society in which the greatest common good is realized,
namely communist society.
I agree with Miller that certain elements of Utilitarian morality seem
difficult to mesh with central Marxist ideas about human nature. Given the
Marxist understanding of the economic basis of society and of class conflict,
it seems that it would be very difflcultto identify a set of "goods" that would
be applicable across all class distinctions, or that a reliable and non-biased
standard of measurement for what does, or does not, promote the common
good of all people could be developed. IS However, it is possible that the
Utilitarian principle could be modified to eliminate these inconsistencies (a."l
Nielsen attempts to do in "Marxism and the Moral Point of View"), and also
the problems I alluded to about defining self-actualization and community
as non-moral goods.
Harry Vander Linden and Allen Buchanan have both advocated a
Marxist evaluative perspective based on Kant's ethical theory.1 6 Such a
perspective would take the familiar categorical imperative. to act in such a
way that you might reasonably wish that all others would act in the same
way, as its highest moral principle. Social arrangements could be assessed
as good or bad to the degree that the economic structure allowed and
encouraged people to act in conformity with this principle. In this case the
14 Miller, Richard. Analyzing Marx: Morality, Power, and History, Princeton, N.J.,
Princeton University Press, 1988, p.35-41; Nielsen, KaL "Marx and the Moral Point of
View," American Philosophical Quarterly, October 1987, p. 294-307.
IS Miller, Analyzing Marx, p. 38-40.
16 Buchanan, Marx and Justice, p.33-35; Vander Linden, Hmy. "Marx and Morality:
An Impossible Synthesis?" Theory and Society, January 1984, p.133-5.
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Marxist would need to show that all people, if they were properly informed
and reasoned correctly, would wish that others would act to bring about a
communist society. If this could be shown successfully, then it would
become morally imperative for all people to work for the transformation of
society into communism.
This brief list is not intended to be exhaustive of all workable,
morally based evaluative perspectives for Marxists. My purpose in this
paper is not to advocate one particular form of moral Marxism, but rather to
show that a proper understanding of Marxism will show that it requires the
grounding of moral principles, and that several plausible systems of moral
Marxismdo exist I do not think that every Marxistmust hold the same moral
principle in order to be consistent with the basic insights of Marxism, only
that every Marxist needs to have some moral basis from which to make
judgements.
Nor do I think that the Marxist system implies one particular set of
moral prinCiples. This is not to say that any moral principle will function in
the Marxist system without contradiction; some types of moral principles,
such as Nozick's natural rights theory, are clearly excluded. What I am
claiming is that there are a variety of plausible moralistic evaluative
perspectives for Marxists, including the three options I have summarized
above, and the question of which one of them is "best" cannot be answered
simply by an examination of the central concepts of Marxism.
While all Marxists would agree with me that there is a very defini tc
evaluative perspective inherent to Marxism, many, such as Allen Wood,
want to claim that this perspective need not, and should not, be a moral one.
Their attempts to construct such a non-moral evaluative perspective for
Marxists fall short of what a consistently Marxist perspective must do.
Marxists are thus confronted with the necessity of moral Marxism, and with
the challenge of constructing this morally based perspective in such a way
that it does not conflict with the critique of moral beliefs that is central to
Marxist social theory.
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